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INTRODUCTION 
 
Mobilizing economic science for water resource 
management decisions has a checkered past in the 
western United States.  In many instances, economic 
analysis of varying degrees of rigor has been applied to 
water resource planning efforts as either an ex post 
validation or critique of a political decision. All too 
rarely do economists play a timely ex ante role 
equivalent to the roles played by politicians, engineers, 
hydrologists, and lawyers in water resource 
management planning and decision-making. 
Responsibility for being a non-player partially rests with 
economists themselves, as we are drawn away from 
difficult Western water issues towards safer discipline-
based research.  However, major responsibility rests 
with public policy makers and private water users who 
often view economic science as a threat to their political 
ideas, particularly their desire to appease special 
political interests by extracting economic rents from 
rate- and taxpayers. 
 
The early history of the Central Arizona Project (CAP) 
is well documented by Johnson (1977), starting with the 
formation of the League of the Southwest in 1919 to 
project authorization by Congress in 1968.  Along the 
way Arizona filed an interstate legal suit against 
California to adjudicate its rights to the use of Colorado 
River water.  This suit ended in 1963 when the U.S. 
Supreme Court decreed that Arizona had a right to 2.8 
million acre-feet of Colorado River water (Arizona v. 
California, 373 U.S. 546).  The consistent authorization 
of federal funding for the CAP proved equally 
contentious for 25 years.  One quid pro quo for 
continued CAP funding required by the Carter 
Administration was the hurried design, passage and 
implementation of the 1980 Groundwater Management 
Act by the State of Arizona.  Construction on the 
Havasu Pumping Plant began in 1973 and households in 
Tucson, at the end of the 335-mile aqueduct, began 
drinking CAP water in November 1992. 
 
The major controversy surrounding the CAP centered 
on its economic feasibility as an agricultural 
development project.  Congressional authorization and 
appropriation required supporting documentation that 
the CAP was necessary for the economic viability of 
central Arizona agriculture.  All parties recognized that 
in 30-50 years the CAP would evolve into a largely 
urban and Native American project due to increasing 
urbanization in central Arizona and successful 
adjudication of Indian water rights.  However, the initial 
economic justification was based on the agricultural 
economy. 
 
The key economic issue surrounding the CAP, at least 
for agriculture, is captured in Figure 1.  First, total 
project cost would approach $5 billion and the aqueduct 
would be 335 miles long.   Not only did a little less than 
half of this cost need to be repaid by water users, but 
also the distribution systems for irrigation districts had 
to be repaid by growers as well.  Some of these systems 
cost grower-managed districts $100 million.  Secondly, 
water had to be lifted over 2,000 feet from the Colorado 
River to Tucson.  Combined with other operations, 
maintenance and repair (OM&R) costs, early 
projections for water costs were two to three times the 
current cost of pumping groundwater.  The fundamental 
question surrounding the early discussion of the CAP 
was, “Can farmers afford this water?” 
 
Early economic analyses, one prior to the signing of the 
Colorado River Basin Act in 1968, challenged the 
economic rationale for the CAP (Young and Martin, 
1967; Kelso et al., 1973).  CAP water, if priced at cost 
of delivery, would drive growers out of business if they 
were forced to substitute CAP water for groundwater.  
Kelso et al. (1973) argued that Arizona had sufficient 
water for economic growth; the real problem according 
to these analysts was the misallocation of existing water 
supplies. Barr and Pingry (1977a,b) released detailed 
reports analyzing the complex cost structure of the 
CAP, warning policy makers that municipal water users 
and taxpayers would pay the majority of the CAP costs. 
These early analyses created a firestorm of criticism 
against the scientific findings.  Careers were threatened 
and financial support for research was withdrawn for a 
time. Bush and Martin (1986) concluded that most 
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Figure 1.  Elevation Changes in the CAP Main Canal 
 
 
irrigation districts would be worse off with the CAP 
than without it.  Not all grower-controlled irrigation 
districts heeded these warnings. 
The remainder of this paper is a brief, personal 
evaluation of the continuing lessons learned as 
economic science attempts to inform water resource 
policy decisions.  The CAP is the case study.  A more 
thorough analysis of the agricultural component of the 
CAP can be found in Wilson (1997). 
 
Nine of 23 potential irrigation districts or agricultural 
operations contracted for CAP water and built 
distribution systems.  By the early 1990s the 
underutilization of CAP water by farmers became a 
serious public policy issue in the state (Wilson, 1992).   
Two irrigation districts declared bankruptcy, the first 
time in U.S. history that a federally supported irrigation 
district has failed economically (Baker, 1995).  
Irrigation districts surrendered their long-term CAP 
contracts for assurance of subsidized CAP water for at 
least 10 years.  The CAP became a municipal and 
industrial (M&I) and Native American project 40 years 
earlier than anticipated by project planners.  And finally, 
the State of Arizona initiated a massive effort to bank 
CAP water in the ground to increase the state’s 
utilization of its Colorado River allocation.  The 
implications of faulty CAP economics have cost 
taxpayers millions of dollars in attorney and consultant 
fees, countless hours of public officials’ time, and lower 
returns on municipal bonds. However, the CAP 
aqueduct continues to be professionally managed and 
operated by the Central Arizona Water Conservation 
District. 
 
ECONOMIC SCIENCE LESSONS 
 
Economics, the science of decision-making under 
scarcity, presents the decision maker with a rich array of 
analytical models for understanding resource allocation 
issues.  These conceptual frameworks produce 
important insights concerning the direction and 
magnitude of change in key variables when existing 
policies are modified or new policies are implemented.  
Economics also has a rich tradition of empirically 
validating economic theory through case study analysis, 
econometric data analysis, financial budgeting, 
laboratory experiments, mathematical programming and 
simulations.  Significant efficiencies are gained for 
society by “getting the economics right” in the public 
policy process.  These cost savings can be comparable 
to or exceed efficiencies realized from engineering, 
financing or legal expertise. 
 
Key federal and state policy makers began to understand 
how “wrong” their economic understanding was as they 
participated in an interdisciplinary, interagency study in 
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the state’s largest CAP irrigation district in the early 
1990s and with the subsequent publication of the team’s 
detailed analysis (Dedrick et al., 1992).  Within months 
it became clear that deals would have to be negotiated 
between all participating parties to avoid a significant 
financial burden on the state’s rate- and taxpayers.  
These deals involved a combination of refinancing, 
contract cancellations, subsidized water for agriculture, 
electrical power generation swaps, increased property 
taxes and a plethora of new CAP water using programs 
(e.g. Water Bank, river rehabilitation projects).  
Adjustments to the institutional environment 
surrounding the CAP continue to this day.  What should 
we learn from this interaction of economic science and 
water management? 
  
Lesson #1: Cheaper is Better 
 
Mainstream economic theory has produced a rich and 
powerful understanding of firm-level decisions using 
the assumption that business managers maximize 
profits.  This scientific construct, while not a perfectly 
accurate view of actual decision-making within the firm, 
has generated a useful body of knowledge on the 
comparative statics of economic behavior.  Within this 
profit-maximizing framework we know that businesses 
will use their cheapest or less expensive inputs first 
(assuming quality is equivalent) in the production of 
goods and services.  The lower-cost producer will 
receive more net returns in the market relative to their 
higher cost counterparts. 
 
Running throughout Bureau of Reclamation (BoR) and 
engineering firm planning documents was the 
assumption that groundwater would play a secondary 
role in Arizona agriculture once CAP water could be 
delivered to farms.  For some hydrologic and economic 
reasons (unknown at least to this author), CAP water 
would soon be cheaper than groundwater.  But the 
reality was that “cheaper is better,” so farmers 
continued to pump lower cost groundwater, leaving 
CAP water in the Colorado River and causing a severe 
underutilization problem for the state’s leaders.  Some 
planners and elected officials demonstrated complete 
surprise when they finally understood how businesses 
make decisions.  But one elected city official in 1994 
still insisted, “Farmers should buy CAP water because 
that is the right thing to do.” 
 
Lesson #2: Willingness to Pay is Less Than Ability to 
Pay 
 
A well-developed and empirically tested concept in 
economics is that people make decisions “on the 
margin.”  We evaluate the incremental (i.e. marginal) 
benefits and costs associated with decisions, going 
forward with the decision if the marginal benefits 
exceed the marginal costs.  In irrigation decision-
making the grower compares the cost of the last acre-
foot of water with the anticipated revenue produced by 
that last acre-foot of water.  Average values of benefits 
and costs are higher over the relevant decision space 
because high and low values over the entire range of 
production levels are averaged.  Averages can be useful 
to establish overall profitability in an accounting sense 
but serve very little purpose in accurately determining 
the economic impact of an adjustment in the business.  
The ability to pay concept is economically flawed as a 
project evaluation criterion. 
 
BoR- and district-funded feasibility studies failed to use 
willingness to pay methods and elevated ability to pay 
for the CAP.  First, it was assumed that all the acreage 
in the CAP districts would be farmed every year for 50 
years.  Secondly, the studies assumed that relatively 
large acreages of a high value crop would be farmed 
every year, an assumption without historical precedence 
then or now.  And finally, these studies failed to 
recognize that growers would use lower-cost 
groundwater resources first.  These errors in economic 
judgment produced a false sense that farmers would buy 
CAP water.  The growers’ willingness to pay on the 
margin actually was one-half to one-third the CAP price 
in the early 1990s.   
 
Lesson #3: You Can’t Predict the Future 
 
The economics of decision-making under uncertainty 
has been a core field in microeconomic theory for thirty 
years.  Economists recognize that the future cannot be 
predicted with certainty.  Therefore, economists and 
financial analysts have developed a wide range of 
models and analytical techniques to produce insights on 
decisions and projects when uncertainty characterizes 
key economic variables.  Possibly the most elementary 
technique is sensitivity analysis, changing a key variable 
by 10 percent to evaluate the impact on a key 
performance measure (e.g. profits, net present value, 
internal rate of return, benefit-cost ratio). 
 
There is no record of any sensitivity analysis being 
performed in the irrigation district feasibility studies.  
Point estimates were used on prices, yields, water 
prices, government programs, the acreage of high value 
crops, etc.   A realistic 10 percent drop in gross 
revenues in the farm models used in these studies would 
have produced an “ability to pay” of approximately $20 
per acre-foot—far below one estimate exceeding $100. 
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The CAP received Congressional funding based on the 
need to develop and support central Arizona agriculture.  
Planners did recognize that in 30-50 years the CAP 
would be a largely urban and Native American project.  
But not surprisingly, with the formal completion of the 
project in 1993, the CAP immediately became a 
municipal, industrial and Native American project.  
These interests had and have today a higher willingness 
to pay for water.  This higher value in alternative uses 
bids water away from lower-value uses.  Unfortunately, 
most of these exchanges are made through high cost 
administrative decisions rather than a market tool 
(Colby, 1993). 
Lesson #4: Price Matters 
 
One of the fundamental theoretical constructs of 
economics is the principle of diminishing marginal 
utility for buyers of goods and service.  As we purchase 
goods and services, eventually we receive less 
satisfaction or fewer benefits from the last good or 
service purchased.  Combined with price, this 
empirically validated principle produces the downward 
sloping demand curves so familiar in economics 
textbooks and used in sophisticated models for public 
policy analysis.   Price must be lowered, ceteris paribus, 
to increase sales.  Higher prices reduce the quantity 
sold.  
OTHER LESSONS LEARNED  
 I vividly recall informally teaching this economic 
principle in the early 1990s during a board meeting of 
the Central Arizona Water Conservation District 
(CAWCD), the autonomous administrative entity 
responsible for the CAP.  A majority of the board 
wanted to survey CAP water users to discover their 
intended water usage so the CAWCD could establish 
the water price.  This is backward economic logic and 
doomed to failure.  Eventually, the board agreed to 
survey water users using a price schedule, asking them 
how much water they would buy at different prices.   
The CAWCD’s revised process developed a demand 
curve, or willingness to pay curve, for water.  With this 
information the CAWCD established a more realistic 
water price and correlated price assumptions to their 
projected financial position. With many elected public 
officials, and even technical personnel in some public 
agencies, the economic lesson that buyers respond to 
price requires constant instruction if a sound 
understanding is to be reached. 
Lessons 1-5 draw upon elementary economic principles 
that have a long and distinguished history in economic 
science.  Economists become frustrated while working 
in the public policy process when decision-makers 
chose to ignore basic economic science.  Water resource 
management policy has a long history of ignoring 
economic reality (Rucker and Fishback, 1983).  The 
study of public choices under constraints has developed 
into two increasingly popular fields in economic 
science: public choice theory and neo-institutional 
economics.  Both fields study how special interests use 
the political process to obtain privileged treatment or 
rents.  Special emphasis is given in both fields to the 
measurement of gains and losses for both the winners 
and losers.  The final three lessons learned from the 
CAP reflect lessons learned in the political economy of 
water resource management. 
 
Lesson #6: Politics Trumps Economics, But Only 
Temporarily  
Lesson #5: I Can Outbid You  
 The “need” for the CAP was obvious to anyone visiting 
central Arizona—it is a desert.  By definition this area 
had a shortage of water.  Therefore, to protect it citizens 
from drought and the lack of economic opportunity, the 
CAP became the Holy Grail for every public official 
and civic leader.  Fear trumps economic science.  With 
the successful completion of the project the current 
questions are who will pay for the available water and 
how will it be allocated?  Basic economic principles 
remain so the pricing and allocation rules must be 
changed to reflect the new economic reality of 
underutilized CAP water. 
The equal marginal value principle in economics 
implies that a resource will be allocated to its highest 
value use until either the quantity constraint of the 
resource is met or the marginal values of all the 
alternative uses are equal.  Operationally, this principle 
produces maximum profit in the case of the firm, 
maximum utility in the case of a consumer, and 
maximum economic welfare in the case of society.  
Value is determined by the willingness to pay for the 
product or service.  So water in a market environment 
will be allocated to its highest value use first (e.g. 
drinking water), then other potable uses in the 
household (e.g. cooking), then . . . and eventually to the 
production of low-value, non-food agricultural crops.  
In practice this optimal allocation process is constrained 
by laws, regulations and property rights that discourage 
a market for water. 
 
Lesson #7: Law Trumps Economics, But Only 
Temporarily 
 
Figure 2 illustrates a theory of economic development 
popularized by Nobel Prize-winning neo-institutional 
economist Douglas North (1990).  Countries face   
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resource, technological, and market constraints over 
which they have limited control.  With a science-based 
knowledge of these constraints, an institutional 
framework should be designed, according to North 
(1990), to create optimal opportunity sets for profit and 
non-profit organizations in the country.  The key to 
economic development is developing appropriate rules 
for managing scarcity.  Organizations can change their 
opportunity sets by modifying the constraint set (e.g. 
technological change) and/or creating different 
institutions (e.g. lobbying Congress for new rules).  
When politics dominate the economics of water 
resource management, institutions are changed, 
frequently to modify the opportunity sets available to 
special interests—municipalities (industry including 
agriculture), Native Americans, environmentalists, and 
recreationists.  Why?  The economic framework for 
socially optimal water allocation is not in place.   
Conflicts arise between these interests, creating an 
ongoing battleground for lawyers specializing in water 
law.  New law will change economic incentives (e.g. 
opportunity sets) for some, but not others.  This 
“improvement” is only temporary because technological 
change, urbanization, population growth, global 
markets, etc. change the constraint set.  Any 
“improvement” also may be temporary when parties not 
served by the new law seek to change it.  
 
Lesson #8: You Have the Deep Pockets 
 
During the early 1980s it became even clearer to some 
analysts that agriculture would not be able to afford 
CAP water (Martin et al., 1982; Martin, 1988).  The 
rational strategy of growers in CAP irrigation districts, 
according to these social scientists, was to play the 
water development game for as long as possible.  Once 
it became clear that they could not afford this water, 
society, via government agencies, would adjust the rules 
and prices in favor of the farmers who were still in 
business.  Growers were well aware that there was legal 
precedent to support this strategy (Smith, 1986).  
  
Who pays when we do not get the economics right?  
You and I do. The favorite fiscal strategy of publicly 
funded projects like the CAP is to spread the costs 
“lightly” across millions of households and concentrate 
the benefits for a relatively select few beneficiaries.  
Urban taxpayers and ratepayers have the proverbial 
deep pockets.   
 
BUILDING WELL-TRAVELED BRIDGES 
BETWEEN ECONOMIC SCIENCE AND WATER 
POLICY 
 
Effective and efficient decision systems for resource 
management require timely and useful information as 
well as the active participation of all impacted parties.  
Water management policy, given its vital role in the 
sustainability of life, demands the best science 
available.  During my twenty years of working 
professionally in agricultural water policy, I have 
observed that good science is often an afterthought in 
the public policy process.  Public policy makers require 
the best, science-based information available, but useful 
science will only be available if there are well-traveled 
information bridges between public agencies, the 
private sector, and the scientists (Figure 3).  Currently, 
these three bridges receive highly variable traffic while 
at other times they fall into disuse.  In some states, these 
bridges may have even fallen into disrepair and 
represent a hazard for the traveler. 
 
Effective and efficient informational bridges cost money 
to construct and maintain.  Optimal two-way 
information flows take time and effort to manage.  
There must be incentives to use them as well.  For 
academics, the disincentives to travel these bridges are 
daunting.  Policy decisions often have technical analysis 
deadlines that teaching faculty find impossible to meet.  
All academic incentives give priority to disciplinary 
research rather than interdisciplinary research and 
outreach education. Water policy decisions require a 
system-wide analysis where all sciences, combined with 
law and politics, produce a sustainable strategy.  But 
this is a messy, time consuming process.  Most 
academic scientists are not trained to think holistically, 
understand competing interests, or have the patience to 
work in multi-disciplinary teams.  The National Science 
Foundation’s sponsored science and technology centers 
are one model for building these needed bridges and 
maintaining two-way traffic between scientists and 
decision-makers. 
  
A CONCLUDING REMARK 
 
A fundamental challenge in water resource management 
is getting the economics right—right for this generation 
as well as future generations.  Understanding the 
physical and biological science behind water scarcity is 
a necessary but not a sufficient condition for effective 
water policy.  Appropriate emphasis as well should be 
placed on the social science of water management 
decision-making at all levels of society.  Social science 
information, to be useful, must travel in a timely and 
effective manner in two directions on established 
information bridges between interested parties. A recent 
revelation associated with the CAP is that social science 
concerns associated with water management, more than 
hydrology and engineering, now drive the sustainability 
of the project.  As Kelso, Martin and Mack (1973: 244) 
prophetically noted nearly thirty years ago, “Water 
scarcity, even growing scarcity, is far less costly to the 
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Arizona economy than is popularly supposed; whatever 
costliness the scarcity does impose, amelioration is far 
more a matter of reforming man-made institutional 
inefficiencies in water administration and management 
than in reforming its nature-made physical scarcities.”  
 
AUTHOR 
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areas of the economics of agribusiness organization and 
management, irrigation technologies and management, 
finance, and environmental management.  Currently 
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the privatization of Mexico’s irrigation districts and an 
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technologies necessary to reduce dust pollution in 
central Arizona.  He has published over 90 professional 
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Arizona for outstanding teaching and student advising.  
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applied economics at the University of Minnesota. 
Figure 3:  Bridging For Improved Water Resource Management
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